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Abstract: Low carbon economy has become a top agenda for many countries following the 
agreement in the Paris meeting on climate change. In this article, we take price and emission 
sensitive demand into account and incorporate competition between the two rival 
manufacturers in the demand function. This research takes more proactive actions 
incorporating carbon emissions in the strategic and operational decisions, which complements 
the existing literature on low carbon manufacturing, in which the carbon emissions attribute is 
often used as a constraint, or only the single manufacturer’s demand is considered. Based on 
game theory, the pricing and carbon emissions reduction decisions are investigated. Our study 
contributes to the existing literature on low carbon manufacturing by specifically examining 
the impact of production efficiency, carbon emissions reduction efficiency, and market power 
structure on achieving low carbon manufacturing. Through the systematic analysis of optimal 
pricing and green technology investment decisions to improve the economic and 
environmental performance under different market power structures, our findings provide 
valuable managerial implications, which will help many manufacturing firms to make 
important strategic and operational decisions regarding low carbon manufacturing. 
Keywords: Low carbon manufacturing; green technology investment; power structure; price 
competition; emission competition. 
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1 Introduction 
With the rapid economic development, the global warming has brought serious challenges to 
human’s survival and development (Hogue et al., 2013). Research has shown that global 
warming is likely to be at least 90% caused by human beings (IPCC, 2007). Transforming of 
the mode of human production and life, and realizing the sustainable development of low 
carbon economy are becoming the focus of global attention (Chen and Hao, 2015). Across 
different industry sectors, the manufacturing sector is often the single largest contributor to 
carbon emissions in most developing and developed countries (Fysikopoulos et al., 2014). In 
order to achieve a more sustainable consumption and production, low carbon manufacturing, 
often referred as the manufacturing process that generates low carbon emissions intensity 
through the effective and efficient use of energy and resources (Tridech and Cheng, 2011), has 
therefore become an important area of research enquiry. Many companies have already started 
to work on developing low carbon emissions manufacturing practices in order to gain 
competitive advantage. Nevertheless, a transition to a low carbon manufacturing will require 
innovation and investment in a range of low carbon technologies and radical changes to 
operation practices in the industry sector.  
To make low carbon manufacturing sustainable, it is essential for companies to develop 
appropriate pricing policies for low carbon products. As the increased awareness of 
environmental protection and the change of the consumption habits, customers are more 
sensitive to low carbon products and willing to pay extra price (Arora, 1995; Bansal and 
Gangopadhyay, 2003; Björklund, 2011; Paksoy and Özceylan, 2013; Chander and 
Muthukrishnan, 2015). In addition, customer environmental consciousness will influence 
carbon emissions reduction strategy and, in return, manufacturer will seek for optimal green 
technology investments to reduce carbon emissions for winning more customers (Geffen and 
Rothenberg, 2000; Laroche et al., 2001; Innes, 2006; Zhu and Sarkis, 2007; Sengupta, 2015; 
Jiang and Chen, 2016; Luo et al., 2016). Therefore, the attribute of low carbon has become an 
influential aspect for customers. In response, manufacturing firms should at least consider the 
demand sensitivity in carbon emissions in the decision making of the pricing and emission 
reduction. These decisions will have a significant impact on manufacturers’ profits. 
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From manufacturers’ perspective, with the increasing consumer environmental 
awareness, the competition between manufacturers is no longer only based on economic 
performance. It also extends to their environmental performance. Therefore, both carbon 
emissions reduction strategy and pricing policies on low carbon products have become crucial 
for manufacturing firms. Adding to the complexity of these decisions, most manufacturers are 
facing intense competition in a competitive market environment. The benefits of competition 
have been extensively covered in the literature, for instance, Moorthy (1988), Banker et al. 
(1998), Hall and Porteus (2000), So (2000), Tsay and Agrawal (2000), etc.. These studies 
examined firms’ optimal operational strategies with competition on quality, pricing, service, 
and delivery time respectively. They also analysed the influence of competitive intensity and 
found that the equilibrium levels of quality and service increase while price and delivery time 
decrease as competition intensifies. More recent work such as Choi and Fredj (2013) and 
Sang (2014), only focused on price competition. However, it is not clear how the power 
dynamics in the marketplace will influence manufacturing firms’ decisions on green 
technology investment and pricing, and the consequential effect on their economic and 
environmental performance. Power issues including market power (Montgomery, 1985; 
Ailawadi et al. 1995; Wei and Zhao, 2016) and supply chain power (Huang et al., 2002; 
Benton and Maloni, 2005; Chen and Wang, 2015) were widely explored in the marketing and 
operations management literature. The existing studies on market power structure between 
rival firms or supply chain power structure between supply chain members mainly focused on 
the profit-related operations decisions like pricing. Few studies have taken environmental 
performance like carbon emissions into consideration. Furthermore, to our best knowledge, no 
research has so far examined the impact of market power structure on the decisions of low 
carbon manufacturing. Therefore, the following key questions are addressed in this research:  
(1) What are the optimal pricing policy and carbon emissions reduction strategy for the 
manufacturers under different market power structures? 
(2) To what extent, do the manufacturers’ production and carbon emissions reduction 
efficiencies affect their optimal prices, investment on green technology, and maximum 
profits? 
(3) What impact do the power structure, price competition and emission competition 
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have on low carbon manufacturing? 
To answer these questions, we consider two rival manufacturers under price and 
emission sensitive demand. The same product is produced by them and sold to customers with 
a demand which is determined by their own and competing manufacturer’s price and unit 
carbon emissions. Using the game theoretical approach, we attempt to obtain the optimal 
solutions for pricing and green technology investment decisions for both manufacturers in a 
balanced power structure and an imbalanced power structure respectively. The impact of the 
production efficiency and carbon emissions reduction efficiency on the manufacturers’ 
optimal pricing and maximum profits is examined in the balanced power structure. We also 
explore the impact of power structure in the imbalanced power structure. Through comparing 
the optimal solutions and performances, this research intends to understand the impact that 
production efficiency, green technology investment, and market power structure have for low 
carbon manufacturing. 
After a review of the literature in Section 2, the model formulation and assumptions are 
presented in Section 3. In Section 4 and 5, the pricing and unit carbon emissions polices in 
Nash and Stackelberg model are discussed respectively, to address Question (1). Section 6 is 
divided into two parts: Section 6.1 examines the impact of production and carbon emissions 
reduction efficiencies, which answers Question (2); and Section 6.2 explores the impact of 
power structure, which answers part of Question (3). Additionally, a numerical example is 
provided in Section 7 to demonstrate the validity of the proposed models. The numerical 
analysis also looks at the impact of price competition and emission competition on the 
optimal decisions, environmental and economic performance, which addresses the remaining 
part of Question (3). Finally, managerial insights are discussed and directions for future work 
are considered in Section 8. 
 
2 Literature review 
The literature reviewed here primarily relates to three research streams: models with carbon 
emissions, applications of price and emission sensitive demand, and the impact of power 
structure on the environmental and organisational performance. 
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The first relevant literature stream focuses on operation management taking carbon 
emissions into consideration and much of those are based on the regulation of carbon 
emissions policies. Penkuhn et al. (1997), Dobos (2005), Letmathe and Balakrishnan (2005) 
and Rong and Lahdelma (2006) did their investigation under different government regulation 
policies such as carbon tax, carbon cap, and cap-and-trade. They obtained the optimal 
operations decisions and analysed the impact of regulation policies on these decisions. More 
recently, Bouchery et al. (2012) investigated optimal order quantity under carbon emissions 
constraint through an expanded Economic Ordering Quantity (EOQ) model with 
multi-objective decision. Rosic and Jammernegg (2013) studied the optimal order source and 
quantity of a single retailer with dual sourcing model under cap-and-trade and carbon tax. 
Zhang and Xu (2013) discussed the impact of carbon cap and trade price on optimal solution 
and performance in a context of a multi-item production firm with a stochastic demand. 
García-Alvarado et al. (2016) extended the work of Ahiska and King (2010) by introducing a 
cap-and-trade mechanism in an infinite-horizon inventory system. They found that inventory 
policy could play an important role in compliance with environmental legislation. Wang et al. 
(2016) presented three mathematical models to study manufacturing/remanufacturing 
planning issues (e.g. optimal production quantities of a new and remanufactured product) 
considering capital and/or carbon emissions constraints. They discussed the impact of carbon 
emissions constraint and found that the carbon emissions constraint will have more distinct 
influences on the manufacturing/remanufacturing decisions, and under that the manufacturer 
need more capital to achieve the maximum profit. Although the relevant literature is rich as 
illustrated above, most of them only consider carbon emissions as a constraint and few of 
them take more proactive actions incorporating carbon emissions in their strategic and 
operational decisions.  
Among the few studies that incorporate emission sensitive demand or consumer 
environmental awareness in their own initiative, Yalabik and Fairchild (2011) studied a 
manufacturer’s optimal price and emissions level under the regulatory penalties and demand 
decrease caused by emissions. They found that when environmentally sensitive customers are 
available, the manufacturer has an incentive to reduce carbon emissions through green 
technology investment. Sengupta (2012) analysed a firm’s decision behaviour on pricing with 
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environmentally conscious consumers. The research finding indicated that firms would be 
willing to disclose their environmental performance to gain better market response when they 
realize their consumers become more aware of environmentally sound products. Hoen et al. 
(2014) studied transport mode selection decision of a carbon-aware company and found that 
company can reduce carbon emissions by switching to a different transport mode. Nouira et al. 
(2014) analysed the impact of emission sensitive customers on manufactures’ profits in the 
scenarios of price sensitive demand and both price and emission sensitive demand. Their 
research found that manufacturer must focus on the impact of carbon emissions of production 
process and material input on the environment. Toptal et al. (2014) investigated one 
manufacturer’s joint decisions on ordering and investment on emission reduction with 
condition of three carbon emissions policies, and analytically compared the impact of 
different policies. Liu et al. (2012), Du et al. (2015) and Zheng et al. (2015) also considered 
consumer environmental awareness and studied its impact on firms’ operations decisions such 
as the optimal ordering policies and coordination contracts and their economic and 
environmental performance. Chen et al. (2016) studied the warehouse management decisions 
under the cap-and-trade emission policy. They obtained the optimal carbon emissions 
reduction policy and analysed the role of green technology investment in managing the 
trade-offs between the economic and environmental performances of warehousing operations. 
Although a few studies have incorporated carbon emissions in their strategic and operational 
decisions, often only one manufacturer is studied without considering the market competition. 
In this research, two competing manufacturers’ optimal pricing and carbon emissions 
reduction policies are studied with price and emission sensitive demand.  
Another relevant research stream looks into the impact of market competition and power 
structure. Most of these researches, such as Choi (1991), Ertek and Griffin (2002), Cai et al. 
(2009), Edirisinghe et al. (2011), Zhang et al. (2012), Shi et al. (2013) and Xiao et al. (2014) 
mainly focus on the supply chain vertical competition between manufacturers and their 
suppliers or between manufacturers and their customers, and very few studies have attempted 
to investigate the effect of the market competition between the rival manufacturers on the 
environmental and organisational performance. Moorthy (1988) examined two identical firms 
competing on product quality and price. They obtained the quality-price equilibrium strategies 
7 
and found that the firm should be differentiating its product from its competitor. Banker et al. 
(1998) studied the impact of competitive intensity on the equilibrium levels of quality and 
found that the relationship between quality and competitive intensity depends on the increased 
competition and other parameters. Hall and Porteus (2000) constructed an explicitly dynamic 
model of firm behaviour in which firms compete based upon customer service and studied 
firm’s capacity decisions in respond to customer service and competition pressure. So (2000) 
assumed that demand is sensitive to both the price and delivery time guarantees. He analysed 
the optimization problem for the individual firms and then studied the equilibrium solution in 
a multiple-firm competition. Tsay and Agrawal (2000) studied two independent retailers who 
use service and retail price to directly compete for end customers. Wu et al. (2012) 
investigated competitive pricing decisions between two retailers in a two-stage supply chain 
with horizontal and vertical competition and obtained the optimal policies. The above 
researches study the impact of the market competition between the rival manufacturers on 
economic performance. The carbon emissions factor is often neglected despite that more 
attention has been paid by customers. Chen and Hao (2014) focused on two competing firms’ 
optimal pricing and production policies with a balanced power structure under emissions tax. 
Their study found that to achieve a certain emissions reduction percentage, the tax charged 
from the firm with high production efficiency should be higher than that from the firm with 
low production efficiency. Luo et al. (2016) examined the role of co-opetitive relationship 
between the rival manufacturers in achieving low carbon manufacturing. The above literature 
that considers carbon emissions factor in the horizontal market competition has only 
examined the balanced power structure and got Nash equilibrium or Bertrand equilibrium. 
However, not much attention has been paid to Stackelberg equilibrium (firms’ pricing, 
production and carbon emissions reduction policies) under the imbalanced power structure. 
Although the effect of imbalanced power structure on firms’ economic performance has been 
investigated by many studies such as Netessine and Shumsky (2005), Wu et al. (2012), 
Grauberger and Kimms (2016), to the best of our knowledge, no one has so far examined the 
impact of market power structures in the context of low carbon manufacturing. This research 
aims to address the gap in the literature by examining the impact of market power structure on 
low carbon manufacturing with the consideration of price and emission sensitive demand and 
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competition 
 
3 Model development and assumption 
We consider a situation that two manufacturing firms producing substitute items compete in a 
same market. We define 𝑎 as the primary market size, which can be interpreted as the total 
market demand for these two products manufactured by manufacturers 1 and 2. Two rival 
manufacturing firms with different production efficiency are considered. To achieve a more 
sustainable consumption and production, the manufacturers seek for green technology to 
“green” product and reduce emissions. We assume the green technology investment as a 
one-off disposable investment to improve the production process. Through that, initial unit 
carbon emission 𝑒0 is decreased to 𝑒𝑖  per product. The investment is 𝐼𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖(𝑒0 − 𝑒𝑖)
2 
(Yalabik and Fairchild, 2011; Choudhary et al., 2015). The quadratic investment function is 
convexity on 𝑒𝑖, which is attributed to diminishing returns from expenditures (Tsay and 
Agrawal, 2000; Bhaskaran and Krishnan, 2009; Ghosh and Shah, 2011).  
Banker et al. (1998) and Tsay and Agrawal (2000) modelled the demand with price and 
quality level sensitive, and price and service level sensitive, respectively. However, in our 
setting, environmental performance is an important factor, thus the demand is influenced by 
both the product price and environmental property. Furthermore, we incorporate competition 
between the two rival manufacturers in the demand function. This is different to many 
existing studies, in which the carbon emissions attribute is often used as a constraint or only 
the single manufacturer’s demand is considered. The manufacturer 𝑖 must choose a price 
level 𝑝𝑖 and a carbon emissions level 𝑒𝑖, and both of those are absolute values. Therefore, 
the demand faced be manufacturer 𝑖 is  
𝑞𝑖 = 𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏2𝑝𝑗 − 𝑘1𝑒𝑖 + 𝑘2𝑒𝑗 
where 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {1,2}  and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 . Note that 𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > 0  and 𝑘1 > 𝑘2 > 0 , in which 𝑏1 >
𝑏2 > 0 means that the influence of the self-price sensitivity is stronger than cross-price 
sensitivity, and similarly 𝑘1 > 𝑘2 > 0 means that self-carbon emissions sensitivity is higher 
than cross-carbon emissions sensitivity. 𝑏2 and 𝑘2 can be also defined as price competition 
and emission competition. Note that the demand function can be rewritten as 
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𝑞𝑖 = 𝑎 − (𝑏1 − 𝑏2)𝑝𝑖 + 𝑏2(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖) − (𝑘1 − 𝑘2)𝑒𝑖 + 𝑘2(𝑒𝑗 − 𝑒𝑖) 
It is straightforward that every unit by which the manufacturer 𝑖 raises (cuts) price 𝑝𝑖 will 
lose (attract) 𝑏1  customers because of 𝑑𝑞𝑖 𝑑𝑝𝑖⁄ = −𝑏1 , that is, (𝑏1 − 𝑏2)  of these 
customers will not purchase (would not have purchased) any products from both 
manufacturers at all, and 𝑏2 of these customers are diverted to (from) manufacturer 𝑗 thanks 
to 𝑑𝑞𝑗 𝑑𝑝𝑖⁄ = 𝑏2 . And every unit by which the manufacturer 𝑖  raises (cuts) carbon 
emissions level 𝑒𝑖  will lose (attract) 𝑘1  customers because of 𝑑𝑞𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑖⁄ = −𝑘1 , that is, 
(𝑘1 − 𝑘2) of these customers will not purchase (would not have purchased) any products from 
both manufacturers at all, and 𝑘2 of these customers are diverted to (from) manufacturer 𝑗 
thanks to 𝑑𝑞𝑗 𝑑𝑒𝑖⁄ = 𝑘2.  
The unit production cost of manufacturer 1 and 2 are 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 respectively. Note that 
unit production cost decreases as the production efficiency improves. Without loss of 
generality, 𝑞1 = 𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐1 + 𝑏2𝑐2 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0 > 0  and 𝑞2 = 𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐2 + 𝑏2𝑐1 − 𝑘1𝑒0 +
𝑘2𝑒0 > 0. That is, without green technology investment, the demand is always positive when 
price equals cost. The parameters and variables for model development are donated as the 
following notations shown in Table 1. The 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝑈1, 𝑈2 and 𝑈
3 − 2𝑉2𝑈 −
𝑘2
2𝑉2 can be easily proved to be positive due to the non-negativity of the decision variables 
and boundedness and concavity of the profit function. 
Table 1 Parameters and variables 
Notation Descriptions 
𝑞1 ,  𝑞2 Production quantities (or customer demands) of manufacturer 1 and 2 respectively 
𝑝1 , 𝑝2 Unit retailing price of manufacturer 1 and 2 respectively 
𝑒0 Initial unit carbon emissions of manufacturer 1 and 2 
𝑒1 , 𝑒2 
Unit carbon emissions after green technology investments of manufacturer 1 and 2 
respectively, 𝑒1 < 𝑒0 and 𝑒2 < 𝑒0 (Yalabik and Fairchild (2011), Zhang and Xu (2013), 
Choudhary et al. (2015), Du et al. (2015) and Luo et al. (2016)) 
𝑐1 , 𝑐2 Unit production cost of manufacturer 1 and 2 respectively, 𝑝1 > 𝑐1 and 𝑝2 > 𝑐2 
𝐼1 , 𝐼2 The green technology investment of manufacturer 1 and 2 respectively 
𝑡1 , 𝑡2 Green technology investment cost coefficient of manufacturer 1 and 2 respectively 
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𝑈𝑖 4𝑏1𝑡𝑖 − 𝑘1
2 
𝑉𝑖 2𝑏2𝑡𝑖 − 𝑘1𝑘2 
𝐴1 
(𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐1 + 𝑏2𝑐2 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0)𝑈2 + (𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐2 + 𝑏2𝑐1 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0)𝑉2
𝑈1𝑈2 − 𝑉1𝑉2
 
𝐴2 
(𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐1 + 𝑏2𝑐2 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0)𝑉1 + (𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐2 + 𝑏2𝑐1 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0)𝑈1
𝑈1𝑈2 − 𝑉1𝑉2
 
𝐵 
(𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐 + 𝑏2𝑐 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0)(𝑈 + 𝑉)
𝑈3 − 2𝑉2𝑈 − 𝑘2
2𝑉2
, 𝑈 = 𝑈𝑖|𝑡𝑖=𝑡 and 𝑉 = 𝑉𝑖|𝑡𝑖=𝑡 
𝐶 
(𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐 + 𝑏2𝑐 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0)[(𝑈 + 𝑘2
2)𝑉 + (𝑈2 − 𝑉2)]
𝑈3 − 2𝑉2𝑈 − 𝑘2
2𝑉2
, 𝑈 = 𝑈𝑖|𝑡𝑖=𝑡 and 𝑉 = 𝑉𝑖|𝑡𝑖=𝑡 
𝐷 
𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐 + 𝑏2𝑐 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0
𝑈 − 𝑉
, 𝑈 = 𝑈𝑖|𝑡𝑖=𝑡 and 𝑉 = 𝑉𝑖|𝑡𝑖=𝑡 
According to the above assumption, the manufacturer 1’s profit, denoted 𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑒1), is 
𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑒1) = (𝑝1 − 𝑐1)(𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑝1 + 𝑏2𝑝2 − 𝑘1𝑒1 + 𝑘2𝑒2) − 𝑡1(𝑒0 − 𝑒1)
2 (1) 
The first term means the profit from product sales, and the second term is the green 
technology investment. Similarly, the manufacturer 2’s profit, denoted 𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝑒2), is 
𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝑒2) = (𝑝2 − 𝑐2)(𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑝2 + 𝑏2𝑝1 − 𝑘1𝑒2 + 𝑘2𝑒1) − 𝑡2(𝑒0 − 𝑒2)
2 (2) 
 
4 Nash model 
In the case of Nash game, each manufacturer has equal market power, and both manufacturers 
make their decisions simultaneously. The order of events is as follows. The manufacturer 1 
decides the product retail price and unit carbon emissions to maximize profit given 
manufacturer 2’s product retail price and unit carbon emissions. At the same time, 
manufacturer 2 decides the product retail price and unit carbon emissions to maximize profit 
given manufacturer 1 product retail price and unit carbon emissions. Finally, when the 
customer demand is realized, the manufacturers gain their revenues. 
For the manufacturers’ optimal prices (𝑝𝑖
𝑛) and unit carbon emissions (𝑒𝑖
𝑛) in a Nash 
game, the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 1 In a Nash game, 𝒑𝟏
𝒏 = 𝒄𝟏 + 𝟐𝒕𝟏𝑨𝟏 , 𝒑𝟐
𝒏 = 𝒄𝟐 + 𝟐𝒕𝟐𝑨𝟐 , 𝒆𝟏
𝒏 = 𝒆𝟎 −
𝒌𝟏𝑨𝟏 and 𝒆𝟐
𝒏 = 𝒆𝟎 − 𝒌𝟏𝑨𝟐. 
This proposition means that in a Nash game, manufacturer 1’s and 2’s optimal prices and 
unit carbon emissions are existent and unique. 
From proposition 1, we obtain manufacturer 1’s optimal production quantities (𝑞1
𝑛) and 
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manufacturer 2’s optimal production quantities (𝑞2
𝑛) respectively as following: 
𝑞1
𝑛 = 2𝑏1𝑡1𝐴1 (3) 
𝑞2
𝑛 = 2𝑏1𝑡2𝐴2 (4) 
From proposition 1, we get the technology investments of manufacturer 1 (𝐼1
𝑛) and 
manufacturer 2 (𝐼2
𝑛) respectively as following: 
𝐼1
𝑛 = 𝑡1𝑘1
2𝐴1
2 (5) 
𝐼2
𝑛 = 𝑡2𝑘1
2𝐴2
2 (6) 
Then we get the maximum profits of manufacturer 1 (𝜋1(𝑝1
𝑛, 𝑒1
𝑛)) and manufacturer 2 
(𝜋2(𝑝2
𝑛, 𝑒2
𝑛)) respectively as following: 
𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1
𝑛, 𝑒1
𝑛) = 𝑡1𝑈1𝐴1
2 (7) 
𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝2
𝑛, 𝑒2
𝑛) = 𝑡2𝑈2𝐴2
2 (8) 
Then, the following corollary is obtained. 
Corollary 1 1) 𝒑𝒊
𝒏, 𝒒𝒊
𝒏, 𝑰𝒊
𝒏 and 𝝅𝒊
𝒏(𝒑𝒊
𝒏, 𝒆𝒊
𝒏) all increase in 𝒂, 𝒆𝒊
𝒏 decrease in 𝒂. 2) 
 𝒆𝒊
𝒏  increases in 𝒄𝒊 , 𝒒𝒊
𝒏 , 𝑰𝒊
𝒏  and 𝝅𝒊
𝒏(𝒑𝒊
𝒏, 𝒆𝒊
𝒏) all decrease in 𝒄𝒊 . 3) Both 𝒑𝒊
𝒏  and 𝒒𝒊
𝒏 
decrease in 𝒕𝒊, 𝒆𝒊
𝒏 increase in 𝒕𝒊. 
This corollary examines both manufacturers’ optimal policies and corresponding 
technology investment and economic performances when facing the changing external 
environment, e.g. primary market size (𝑎) in a Nash game. From the perspective of economics, 
it is easy to understand that as the increasing primary market size will lead to higher price and 
production quantity, which is an effective mechanism for manufacturers to balance the 
demand and supply. From the perspective of manufacturers, both manufacturers may take a 
low price strategy to gain market share in the short term. However, in the long run, a 
manufacturer must develop green technology to reduce carbon emissions and gain 
competitive advantage. Due to the high green technology investment, the manufacturers will 
pass on the additional costs to the end consumers and then set higher prices. Therefore, when 
the primary market size expands, the manufacturers can gain more profit by raising price and 
increasing green technology investment. Similarly, when the unit production cost increases 
(production efficiency decreases), more money will be used to produce goods even though the 
product quantity is declining. Therefore, the capital supposed to invest to reduce carbon 
emissions level will become less and the unit carbon emissions will go up. As a result, high 
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production cost (low production efficiency) has weighed on profit growth. An increase of 
green technology investment cost coefficient (decrease of carbon emissions reduction 
efficiency) will escalate the unit carbon emissions. Due to the high unit carbon emissions, 
some customers are not willing to buy that kind of goods. As a result, the manufacturers set a 
much lower price.  
 
5 Stackelberg model 
Generally speaking, there exist two Stackelberg game models, namely, Manufacturer 
1-Stackelberg model (Manufacturer 1 dominates Manufacturer 2), and Manufacturer 
2-Stackelberg model (Manufacturer 2 dominates Manufacturer 1). However, we focus on the 
impact of market power structure and let 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐 and 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡, thus these two 
manufacturers have no difference and Manufacturer 1-Stackelberg model and Manufacturer 
2-Stackelberg model are symmetric. Therefore, just two power structures are analysed in our 
model. We assume the manufacturer 1 is the Stackelberg leader and the manufacturer 2 is the 
Stackelberg follower. Manufacturer 1 and 2 make their decisions in sequence. The order of 
events is as follows. First, manufacturer 2 decides the product retail price and unit carbon 
emissions given manufacturer 1’s product retail price and unit carbon emissions. Then, 
manufacturer 1 chooses optimal product retail price and unit carbon emissions using the 
response function of manufacturer 2 to maximize profit.  
For the manufacturers’ optimal prices (𝑝𝑖
𝑠 ) and unit carbon emissions (𝑒𝑖
𝑠 ) in a 
Stackelberg game, the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 2 In a Stackelberg game, 𝒑𝟏
𝒔 = 𝒄 + 𝟐𝒕𝑼𝑩, 𝒑𝟐
𝒔 = 𝒄 + 𝟐𝒕𝑪, 𝒆𝟏
𝒔 = 𝒆𝟎 −
(𝒌𝟏𝑼 − 𝒌𝟐𝑽)𝑩 and 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 = 𝒆𝟎 − 𝒌𝟏𝑪. 
This proposition means that in a Stackelberg game, manufacturers’ optimal prices and 
unit carbon emissions are existent and unique. 
From proposition 2, we obtain manufacturer 1’s optimal production quantities (𝑞1
𝑠) and 
manufacturer 2’s optimal production quantities (𝑞2
𝑠) respectively as following: 
𝑞1
𝑠 = 2𝑡(𝑏1𝑈 − 𝑏2𝑉)𝐵 (9) 
𝑞2
𝑠 = 2𝑡𝑏1𝐶 (10) 
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From proposition 2, we get the technology investments of manufacturer 1 (𝐼1
𝑠) and 
manufacturer 2 (𝐼2
𝑠) as following: 
𝐼1
𝑠 = 𝑡(𝑘1𝑈 − 𝑘2𝑉)
2𝐵2 (11) 
𝐼2
𝑠 = 𝑡𝑘1
2𝐶2 (12) 
Then we get the maximum profits of manufacturer 1 (𝜋1(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠)) and manufacturer 2 
(𝜋2(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠)) respectively as following: 
𝜋1
𝑠(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠) = 𝑡(𝑈3 − 2𝑉2𝑈 − 𝑘2
2𝑉2)𝐵2 (13) 
𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) = 𝑡𝑈𝐶2 (14) 
Then, the following corollary is obtained. 
Corollary 2 1) 𝒑𝒊
𝒔, 𝒒𝒊
𝒔, 𝑰𝒊
𝒔 and 𝝅𝒊
𝒔(𝒑𝒊
𝒔, 𝒆𝒊
𝒔) all increase in 𝒂, 𝒆𝒊
𝒔 decrease in 𝒂. 2) 
 𝒆𝒊
𝒔 increases in 𝒄, 𝒒𝒊
𝒔, 𝑰𝒊
𝒔 and 𝝅𝒊
𝒔(𝒑𝒊
𝒔, 𝒆𝒊
𝒔) all decrease in 𝒄. 
Similar to Corollary 1, this corollary also explores the effect of primary market size and 
unit production cost on the two manufacturers’ optimal policies as well as corresponding 
technology investment and economic performances in a Stackelberg game. From this 
corollary, we know that when the primary market size is big, higher prices, more products 
with low unit carbon emissions and more green technology investments will be the optimal. 
For unit production cost (production efficiency), when the production cost increases 
(production efficiency decreases), it is optimal to reduce production quantities and green 
technology investments. However, such an action will result in relatively high unit carbon 
emissions and worse economic performance. 
 
6 Discussions 
Here, we attempt to analyse the impact of production efficiency and carbon emissions 
reduction efficiency on the two rival manufacturers’ optimal pricing policies, production 
quantities, investments in green technology and maximum profits in a Nash game, and then 
discuss the impact of the imbalanced market power on the two competing manufacturers’ 
optimal pricing policies and maximum profits in a Stackelberg game. 
6.1 The impact of production efficiency and carbon emissions reduction efficiency 
Firstly, to discuss the impact of production efficiency on the two rival manufacturers’ optimal 
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pricing policies, production quantities, investments in green technology and maximum profit, 
we define 𝑐1 < 𝑐2 and 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡, that is, the production efficiency of manufacturer 1 is 
higher than that of manufacturer 2 and both of them have the same carbon emissions 
reduction efficiency. For the manufacturers’ optimal pricing policies (𝑝𝑐1
𝑛 , 𝑝𝑐2
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑐1
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑐2
𝑛 ) and 
optimal production quantity (𝑞𝑐1
𝑛 , 𝑞𝑐2
𝑛 ), optimal investment in green technology (𝐼𝑐1
𝑛 , 𝐼𝑐2
𝑛 ) and 
maximum profit (𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝𝑐1
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑐1
𝑛 ), 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝𝑐2
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑐2
𝑛 )), the following proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 3 In a Nash game, when 𝒄𝟏 < 𝒄𝟐  and 𝒕𝟏 = 𝒕𝟐 = 𝒕, then 1) If 𝒕 ≤
𝒌𝟏
𝟐+𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟏
, then 𝒑𝒄𝟏
𝒏 ≥ 𝒑𝒄𝟐
𝒏 ; if 𝒕 >
𝒌𝟏
𝟐+𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟏
, then 𝒑𝒄𝟏
𝒏 < 𝒑𝒄𝟐
𝒏 . 2) 𝒆𝒄𝟏
𝒏 < 𝒆𝒄𝟐
𝒏 . 3) 𝒒𝒄𝟏
𝒏 > 𝒒𝒄𝟐
𝒏 . 4) 
𝑰𝒄𝟏
𝒏 > 𝑰𝒄𝟐
𝒏 . 5) 𝝅𝟏
𝒏(𝒑𝒄𝟏
𝒏 , 𝒆𝒄𝟏
𝒏 ) > 𝝅𝟐
𝒏(𝒑𝒄𝟐
𝒏 , 𝒆𝒄𝟐
𝒏 ). 
From this proposition, we know that low production efficiency or high unit product cost 
does not necessarily mean high unit retail price, which is also influenced by the green 
technology investment cost coefficient (𝑡). If the investment cost coefficient (𝑡) is lower than 
a certain ratio, then the optimal price of manufacturer 1 (higher production efficiency) is 
higher than that of manufacturer 2 (lower production efficiency). Otherwise, as the investment 
cost coefficient (𝑡) is higher than the ratio, the relationship between the two optimal prices 
will be in opposite. This ratio in Nash game is decided by carbon emissions sensitivities of the 
two manufacturers and the self-price sensitivity of manufacturer 1. Due to the high production 
efficiency or low unit product cost of manufacturer 1, he can invest more money to obtain 
greener products than manufacturer 2 with low production efficiency or high unit product cost. 
Therefore, the unit carbon emissions of manufacturer 1 is lower than that of manufacturer 2. 
We can also find that no matter what relationship between manufacturers’ prices under two 
different production efficiencies or unit product costs, the demand for the product with low 
unit carbon emissions is always higher than that with high unit carbon emissions. That is, the 
emission level is a more dominant factor as compared to the price level and greener products 
can gain a large market share. Although the technology investment of manufacturer 1 is more 
than manufacturer 2, a larger demand contributed by the environmental friendly product can 
help manufacturer 1 gain more profits.From this proposition we can conclude that under the 
carbon emissions sensitive demand, manufacturers can still increase their profits by 
improving production efficiency to reduce production cost, which is similar to the general 
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model without low carbon manufacturing.  
Secondly, to examine the impact of carbon emissions reduction efficiency on the two 
rival manufacturers’ optimal pricing policies, production quantities, investments in green 
technology and maximum profits, we define 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐 and 𝑡1 < 𝑡2, that is both of them 
have the same production efficiency and the carbon emissions reduction efficiency of 
manufacturer 1 is higher than that of manufacturer 2. As to the manufacturers’ optimal 
policies (𝑝𝑡1
𝑛 , 𝑝𝑡2
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑡1
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑡2
𝑛 ) and optimal production quantity (𝑞𝑡1
𝑛 , 𝑞𝑡2
𝑛 ), optimal investment in 
green technology (𝐼𝑡1
𝑛 , 𝐼𝑡2
𝑛 ) and maximum profit (𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝𝑡1
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑡1
𝑛 ), 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝𝑡2
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑡2
𝑛 )), the following 
proposition is obtained. 
Proposition 4 In a Nash game, when 𝒄𝟏 = 𝒄𝟐 = 𝒄 and 𝒕𝟏 < 𝒕𝟐, then 1) 𝒑𝒕𝟏
𝒏 > 𝒑𝒕𝟐
𝒏 . 2) 
𝒆𝒕𝟏
𝒏 < 𝒆𝒕𝟐
𝒏 . 3) 𝒒𝒕𝟏
𝒏 > 𝒒𝒕𝟐
𝒏 . 4) 𝑰𝒕𝟏
𝒏 > 𝑰𝒕𝟐
𝒏 . 5) If 
𝒕𝟏
𝒕𝟐
≥
(𝑼𝟏+𝑽𝟏)
𝟐𝑼𝟐
(𝑼𝟐+𝑽𝟐)𝟐𝑼𝟏
, then 𝝅𝟏
𝒏(𝒑𝒕𝟏
𝒏 , 𝒆𝒕𝟏
𝒏 ) ≥
𝝅𝟐
𝒏(𝒑𝒕𝟐
𝒏 , 𝒆𝒕𝟐
𝒏 ); if 
𝒕𝟏
𝒕𝟐
<
(𝑼𝟏+𝑽𝟏)
𝟐𝑼𝟐
(𝑼𝟐+𝑽𝟐)𝟐𝑼𝟏
, then 𝝅𝟏
𝒏(𝒑𝒕𝟏
𝒏 , 𝒆𝒕𝟏
𝒏 ) < 𝝅𝟐
𝒏(𝒑𝒕𝟐
𝒏 , 𝒆𝒕𝟐
𝒏 ). 
This proposition means that the optimal price, production quantity and investment in 
green technology of manufacturer 1 (high emission reduction efficiency) are all higher than 
that of manufacturer 2 (low emission reduction efficiency). And the optimal unit carbon 
emissions of manufacturer 1 are lower than that of manufacturer 2. When the ratio between 
high and low emission reduction efficiency (investment cost coefficient of manufacturer 1 and 
2) is higher than 
(𝑈1+𝑉1)
2𝑈2
(𝑈2+𝑉2)2𝑈1
, the maximum profits of manufacturer 1 are higher than that of 
manufacturer 2. Especially, when the ratio between high and low emission reduction 
efficiency (investment cost coefficient of manufacturer 1 and 2) is just the same as or lower 
than 
(𝑈1+𝑉1)
2𝑈2
(𝑈2+𝑉2)2𝑈1
, the maximum profits of manufacturer 1 are equal or less than that of 
manufacturer 2, that is the manufacturer cannot gain more profits by investing higher 
emission reduction efficiency green technology. This proposition indicates that although the 
manufacturer with high emission reduction efficiency has a large investment in green 
technology and gain more environmentally friendly products, the profits he gets are not the 
most.  
6.2 The impact of power structure 
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The operations research on power structure often focuses on supply chains including power 
relationships between suppliers and manufacturers or manufacturers and retailers. Many of 
them have found that the member of the supply chain who has more power (Stackelberg 
leader) will gain more benefits or profits (Chen and Wang, 2015). But in our study, the 
imbalanced power structure of two horizontally competing manufacturers has totally different 
conclusions compared to the vertical competition between supply chain members. As to the 
manufacturers’ optimal policies ( 𝑝1
𝑠 , 𝑝2
𝑠 , 𝑒1
𝑠 , 𝑒2
𝑠 ) and maximum profit ( 𝜋1
𝑠(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠) , 
𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠)), the following proposition is obtained (manufacturer 1 Stackelberg). 
Proposition 5 In a Stackelberg game, 1) if 𝒕 ∈ (𝟎,
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
) ∪ (
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐+𝒌𝟐
𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
, +∞), then 𝒑𝟏
𝒔 >
𝒑𝟐
𝒔 ; 𝒕 ∈ [
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
,
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐+𝒌𝟐
𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
], then 𝒑𝟏
𝒔 ≤ 𝒑𝟐
𝒔 . 2) If (𝟐𝒃𝟏𝒌𝟐 + 𝒃𝟐𝒌𝟐 − 𝒃𝟐𝒌𝟏)(𝟐𝒃𝟐𝒕 − 𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐) ≥ 𝟎, 
then 𝒆𝟏
𝒔 ≥ 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 ; if (𝟐𝒃𝟏𝒌𝟐 + 𝒃𝟐𝒌𝟐 − 𝒃𝟐𝒌𝟏)(𝟐𝒃𝟐𝒕 − 𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐) < 𝟎, then 𝒆𝟏
𝒔 < 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 . 
This proposition means that in a Stackelberg game the unit retail price is influenced by 
the green technology investment cost coefficient (𝑡). When the cost coefficient is relatively 
low or high, the Stackelberg leader (manufacturer 1) will set higher unit retail price than the 
follower (manufacturer 2). When the cost coefficient is moderate, the leader’s unit retail price 
will be lower than that of the follower’s. However, in the vertical competition between supply 
chain members, the Stackelberg leader will always set high price. When the cost coefficient is 
equal to the boundary values, then the competing manufacturers’ optimal unit retail price are 
the same with different market power. The relationship of unit carbon emissions between the 
two competing manufacturers is contingent on values of parameters describing the green 
technology investment cost coefficient, sensitive intensity and competitive intensity. 
Proposition 6 In a Stackelberg game, if (𝒃𝟐𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐 − 𝒃𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐 − 𝒃𝟐
𝟐𝒕)(𝟑𝑼𝑽 + 𝟐𝑼𝟐 +
𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝑽)𝑽 ≥ 𝟎 , then 𝝅𝟏
𝒔 (𝒑𝟏
𝒔 , 𝒆𝟏
𝒔 ) ≥ 𝝅𝟐
𝒔 (𝒑𝟐
𝒔 , 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 ) ; if (𝒃𝟐𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐 − 𝒃𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐 − 𝒃𝟐
𝟐𝒕)(𝟑𝑼𝑽 + 𝟐𝑼𝟐 +
𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝑽)𝑽 < 𝟎, then 𝝅𝟏
𝒔 (𝒑𝟏
𝒔 , 𝒆𝟏
𝒔 ) < 𝝅𝟐
𝒔 (𝒑𝟐
𝒔 , 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 ). 
From proposition 6, we know that in the imbalanced market power structure, the 
relationship of maximum profits between manufacturers with different market power is 
uncertain, which is determined by the green technology investment cost coefficient, sensitive 
intensity and competitive intensity. So it is not always the case that the manufacturer with 
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more market power gains more profit than that of the manufacturer with less market power. 
In a Nash model, when 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐  and 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡 , the optimal prices can be 
rewritten as 𝑝1
𝑛 = 𝑝2
𝑛 = 𝑝𝑛 = 𝑐 + 2𝑡𝐷, and so as to the optimal unit carbon emissions, 𝑒1
𝑛 =
𝑒2
𝑛 = 𝑒𝑛 = 𝑒0 − 𝑘1𝐷 . The maximum profits is 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1
𝑛, 𝑒1
𝑛) = 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝1
𝑛, 𝑒1
𝑛) = 𝜋𝑛(𝑝𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) =
𝑇𝑈𝐷2. By cross comparison of Nash and Stackelberg settings, the following proposition can 
be obtained. 
Proposition 7 (1) For the Stackelberg leader with more market power: 1) 𝒑𝟏
𝒔 ≥ 𝒑𝒏. If 
𝒕 ∈ (𝟎,
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
), then 𝒆𝟏
𝒔 < 𝒆𝒏; if 𝒕 ∈ [
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
,
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐+𝜸
𝟐𝒃𝟐
], then 𝒆𝟏
𝒔 ≥ 𝒆𝒏; if 𝒕 ∈ (
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐+𝜸
𝟐𝒃𝟐
, +∞), then 
𝒆𝟏
𝒔 < 𝒆𝒏, where 𝜸 =
𝒌𝟐(𝑈
2−𝑉2)
𝒌𝟏(𝑼+𝒌𝟐
𝟐)
> 𝟎. 2) 𝝅𝟏
𝒔 (𝒑𝟏
𝒔 , 𝒆𝟏
𝒔 ) ≥ 𝝅𝒏(𝒑𝒏, 𝒆𝒏). 
(2) For the Stackelberg follower with less market power: 1) If 𝒕 ∈ (𝟎,
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
], then 
𝒑𝟐
𝒔 ≤ 𝒑𝒏 and 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 ≥ 𝒆𝒏; if 𝒕 ∈ (
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
, +∞), then 𝒑𝟐
𝒔 > 𝒑𝒏 and 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 < 𝒆𝒏. 2) When 𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐 −
𝜹 > 𝟎 , if 𝒕 ∈ (𝟎,
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐−𝜹
𝟐𝒃𝟐
) , 𝝅𝟐
𝒔 (𝒑𝟐
𝒔 , 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 ) > 𝝅𝒏(𝒑𝒏, 𝒆𝒏) ; if 𝒕 ∈ [
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐−𝜹
𝟐𝒃𝟐
,
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
] , then 
𝝅𝟐
𝒔 (𝒑𝟐
𝒔 , 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 ) ≤ 𝝅𝒏(𝒑𝒏, 𝒆𝒏) ; if 𝒕 ∈ (
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
, +∞) , then 𝝅𝟐
𝒔 (𝒑𝟐
𝒔 , 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 ) > 𝝅𝒏(𝒑𝒏, 𝒆𝒏) . When 
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐 − 𝜹 < 𝟎 , if 𝒕 ∈ (𝟎,
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
] , then 𝝅𝟐
𝒔 (𝒑𝟐
𝒔 , 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 ) ≤ 𝝅𝒏(𝒑𝒏, 𝒆𝒏); if 𝒕 ∈ (
𝒌𝟏𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝒃𝟐
, +∞) , then 
𝝅𝟐
𝒔 (𝒑𝟐
𝒔 , 𝒆𝟐
𝒔 ) > 𝝅𝒏(𝒑𝒏, 𝒆𝒏), where 𝜹 =
𝟐(𝑼𝟑−𝟐𝑽𝟐𝑼−𝒌𝟐
𝟐𝑽𝟐)
𝑽𝟐+𝑼𝒌𝟐
𝟐 > 0. 
Proposition 7 explores a cross comparison of Nash and Stackelberg settings based on 
manufacturers with different market power. From (1) of Proposition 7, compared to the 
optimal solutions in a balanced market power structure, in an imbalanced market power 
structure when one acts as a Stackelberg leader by gaining more competitive advantage and 
higher market status, he will tend to set a higher price. In addition, the leader will obtain more 
profits than that in a balanced market power structure. However, for the emission level, the 
relationship of optimal unit carbon emissions between the two power structures is determined 
by the investment cost coefficient and the competition of price and emission level. That is, a 
firm with higher market status frequently carries out the power of pricing but not good 
environmental indexes to manifest his strong competitive advantages. Although we cannot 
deny environmental performance’s significance to firms and whole society, it does not play a 
crucial role in gaining great economic benefits. Meanwhile, the unequal competitive force 
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contributes to an imbalanced market power, as to the market follower, his optimal operation 
policies including pricing and emission level decisions have to be changed on the basis of the 
investment cost coefficient and the competition of price and emission level. In addition, the 
profit is more or less than before which is not sure. That is, the product with high unit carbon 
emissions can be priced lower or high-price product can be produced greener to attract more 
buyers and gain more profit than that in a balanced market power. Therefore, in some sense, 
the imperfect competition caused by unequal competitive advantages is not a bad situation. 
 
7 Numerical analysis 
In this section, a numerical example is provided to demonstrate the feasibility of the 
mathematical models and analyse the impact of price competition (𝑏2 ) and emission 
competition (𝑘2) on the decisions of prices and unit carbon emissions. We also show their 
impact on total carbon emissions and maximum profits in different power structures. We 
specify 𝑎 = 500, 𝑏1 = 25, 𝑘1 = 25, 𝑒0 = 20, 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐 = 10,  𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡 = 15. We 
define 𝑘2 = 15 and 𝑏2 = 20 respectively to investigate the impact of price and emission 
competition. The results are given in Figure 1-5. 
  
Figure 1 Impact of price competition and emission competition on optimal prices 
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Figure 2 Impact of price competition and emission competition on optimal unit carbon emissions 
  
Figure 3 Impact of price competition and emission competition on optimal production quantity 
Figure 1 to 3 depict that as the price and emission competition intensify, the two 
competing manufacturers will set higher prices, production quantities, and lower unit carbon 
emissions. And also we can see as the intension of price competition, the changing extent of 
optimal prices, production quantities and unit carbon emissions are getting more significant 
and as the intension of emission competition, the changing extent is relevantly insignificant. 
Intuitively, as the consumer environmental awareness increases and the emission competition 
intensifies, the manufacturers will increase investments in green technology to reduce unit 
carbon emissions and increase production quantities. 
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Figure 4 Impact of price competition and emission competition on total carbon emissions 
  
Figure 5 Impact of price competition and emission competition on maximum profits 
In figure 4, it is interesting to see that as price competition intensities, the total carbon 
emissions will decrease after increasing to the peak and as emission competition intensities, 
the total carbon emissions will increase all the time. This is partly because the unit carbon 
emission is lower as the increasing of emission competition, but the low-carbon product 
demand will largely increase which results in higher total carbon emissions. 
Figure 5 shows that as the price and emission competition intensify, the two competing 
manufacturers will gain more profits and the changing extent of profits caused by price 
competition is more significant than that of profits caused by emission competition. Intuitively, 
it seems that both price and emission competition will push up higher production quantity and 
lower unit carbon emissions and bring benefits for manufacturers to capture more profits, but 
these improvements are based on higher unit product retail prices and total carbon emissions 
(always for emission competition and sometimes for price competition). So we can infer that 
from manufacturers’ perspective, the environment performance of price competition is better 
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than that of emission competition.  
 
8 Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
In this paper, we study two rival manufacturers’ optimal pricing and emissions reduction 
decisions with different market power structures. Using non-cooperative game theory, we 
build pricing and emissions level decision models with price and emissions sensitive demand. 
Then we derive the manufacturers’ optimal pricing and unit carbon emissions decisions in 
both the balanced and imbalanced power structures respectively. What’s more, the impact of 
production and carbon emissions reduction efficiencies are discussed in the balanced power 
structure and the effect of the imbalanced market power structure on the two competing 
manufacturers’ optimal pricing decisions and maximum profits are also examined. The main 
results are as following:  
(1) Our findings show that for the two rival manufacturers with different production 
efficiency under the balanced power structure, the relationship between the two manufacturers’ 
optimal prices is affected by green technology investment cost coefficient. When the 
investment cost coefficient is relatively small, the optimal price of manufacturer with high 
production efficiency is higher than that of manufacturer with low production efficiency, and 
vice versa. High production efficiency will result in lower unit carbon emissions and higher 
production quantity, green technology investment and profit. 
(2) We also find that for the two rival manufacturers with different carbon emissions 
reduction efficiency under the balanced power structure, higher carbon emissions reduction 
efficiency will make the manufacturer produce more, invest more in green technology and get 
low-carbon goods. This finding is similar to the previous research Luo et al. (2016), who also 
examined the effect of carbon emissions reduction efficiency under the cap-and-trade policy. 
In this case, how green a product is depends on the carbon emissions reduction efficiency. 
Therefore, carbon emissions reduction efficiency is a critical factor that should be carefully 
considered when adopting green technology. The relationship of the two manufacturers’ 
profits is determined by their green technology investment cost coefficient. We find that 
although the manufacturer with high emission reduction efficiency has a larger investment in 
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green technology and produce more environmentally friendly products. Nevertheless, it does 
not necessarily lead to more profits.  
(3) In the imbalanced power structure, our study shows that power structure have a 
complex effect on the two manufacturers’ optimal pricing decisions and maximum profits 
which contingent on the price and emission sensitivity, price and emission competition and 
the green technology investment cost coefficient. Therefore, the manufacturers who have 
strong market power do not always obtain more profits than others with less market power, 
which is different to the findings of other studies on channel and supply chain power structure 
(Zhang et al. 2012; Chen and Wang 2015; Chen et al. 2016). By exploring a cross comparison 
of the policies and profits of a manufacturer in Nash and Stackelberg settings, the one when 
gaining more market power tends to set a higher price and obtain more profits than ever 
before, but the products he produces may be not as greener as he used to do in a balanced 
power structure.  
(4) Strong price and emission competition make manufacturers set higher unit retail 
prices and lower unit carbon emissions. Manufacturers can obtain more profits through 
improving production quantities with an increasing marginal utility caused by price 
competition and a diminishing marginal utility caused by emission competition, but that may 
result in larger total carbon emissions and lead to poor environment performance. 
This research has three main contributions. First, our paper extends the existing literature 
on low carbon manufacturing by specifically examining the impact of production efficiency, 
green technology investment, and market power structure in achieving low carbon 
manufacturing. Second, our study not only takes price and emission sensitive demand into 
account, but also incorporates competition between the two rival manufacturers in the demand 
function. This is different to many existing studies in which the carbon emissions attribute is 
often used as a constraint and few of them take more proactive actions incorporating carbon 
emissions in their strategic and operational decisions, and only the single manufacturer’s 
demand is considered (Rong and Lahdelma, 2006; Bouchery et al., 2012; Toptal et al., 2014). 
Third, through the systematic analysis of optimal pricing decision and green technology 
investments to improve the economic and environmental performance of the two competing 
manufacturers under different market power structures, our findings provide valuable 
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managerial implications, which will help many manufacturing firms to make important 
strategic and operational decisions regarding low carbon manufacturing.  
The work in our paper can be further extended in several avenues. First, we only 
consider two rival manufacturers in this research. In fact, one future research avenue is to take 
multiple manufacturers into consideration. In addition, achieving a low carbon economy 
requires the coordination of the whole supply chain. It is therefore important to extend the 
current research from the manufacturing level to the whole supply chain level. Another 
interesting extension is to look into carbon emissions policies such as mandatory carbon 
emissions capacity, carbon tax and cap-and-trade, and discuss the impact of various carbon 
policies on low carbon manufacturing and investment in low carbon technologies on 
competitiveness. In addition, some business cases could be included to investigate the nature 
of the investment impact in the long run. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1 
From (1), we get 
𝜕𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1
= (𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑝1 + 𝑏2𝑝2 − 𝑘1𝑒1 + 𝑘2𝑒2) − 𝑏1(𝑝1 − 𝑐1)  and 
𝜕𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1
= −𝑘1(𝑝1 − 𝑐1) + 2𝑡1(𝑒0 − 𝑒1) . Then ，  we obtain 
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1
2 = −2𝑏1 < 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1
2 = −2𝑡1  and 
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1𝜕𝑒1
=
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1𝜕𝑝1
= −𝑘1 , then we get 
|
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1
2
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1𝜕𝑒1
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1𝜕𝑝1
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1
2
| = 4𝑏1𝑡1 − 𝑘1
2 = 𝑈1 > 0 . Therefore, 𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑒1)  is a joint concave 
function of 𝑝1 and 𝑒1. From (2), we can also get that |
𝜕2𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑒2)
𝜕𝑝2
2
𝜕2𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑒2)
𝜕𝑝2𝜕𝑒2
𝜕2𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒2𝜕𝑝2
𝜕2𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒2
2
|=4𝑏1𝑡2 −
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𝑘1
2 = 𝑈2 > 0 . Therefore, 𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝑒2)  is a joint concave function of 𝑝2  and 𝑒2 . Let 
𝜕𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1
=
𝜕𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1
=
𝜕𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑒2)
𝜕𝑝2
=
𝜕𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒2
= 0, we get 
(𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑝1 + 𝑏2𝑝2 − 𝑘1𝑒1 + 𝑘2𝑒2) − 𝑏1(𝑝1 − 𝑐1) = 0 (1-1) 
−𝑘1(𝑝1 − 𝑐1) + 2𝑡1(𝑒0 − 𝑒1) = 0 (1-2) 
 (𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑝2 + 𝑏2𝑝1 − 𝑘1𝑒2 + 𝑘2𝑒1) − 𝑏1(𝑝2 − 𝑐2) = 0 (1-3) 
−𝑘1(𝑝2 − 𝑐2) + 2𝑡2(𝑒0 − 𝑒2) = 0 (1-4) 
From (1-1), (1-2), (1-3) and (1-4), we get 𝑝1
𝑛 = 𝑐1 + 2𝑡1𝐴1, 𝑝2
𝑛 = 𝑐2 + 2𝑡2𝐴2, 𝑒1
𝑛 =
𝑒0 − 𝑘1𝐴1  and 𝑒2
𝑛 = 𝑒0 − 𝑘1𝐴2 . As 𝑝1
𝑛 > 𝑐1  and  𝑝2
𝑛 > 𝑐2 , then 𝐴1 > 0  and  𝐴2 > 0 . 
This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Corollary 1 
Since 0 < 𝐴1 =
(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐1+𝑏2𝑐2−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)𝑈2+(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐2+𝑏2𝑐1−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)𝑉2
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
<
𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑎−𝑏1𝑐1+𝑏2𝑐2−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0,𝑎−𝑏1𝑐2+𝑏2𝑐1−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0}(𝑈2+𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
 and 0 < 𝐴2 =
(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐1+𝑏2𝑐2−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)𝑉1+(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐2+𝑏2𝑐1−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)𝑈1
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
<
𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝑎−𝑏1𝑐1+𝑏2𝑐2−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0,𝑎−𝑏1𝑐2+𝑏2𝑐1−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0}(𝑈1+𝑉1)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
, and it is easy to understand that when 
𝑝1 → 𝑐1 , 𝑝2 → 𝑐2 , 𝑒1 → 𝑒0  and 𝑒2 → 𝑒0 , then 𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐1 + 𝑏2𝑐2 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0 > 0 . 
Therefore, we get 
𝑈2+𝑉2
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0 and 
𝑈1+𝑉1
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0. And note that the above analysis is true 
for any 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. 
Proposition 1 shows 
𝑑𝑝1
𝑛
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡1(𝑈2+𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0, 
𝑑𝑝2
𝑛
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡2(𝑈1+𝑉1)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0, 
𝑑𝑒1
𝑛
𝑑𝑎
= −
𝑘1(𝑈2+𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
<
0 and 
𝑑𝑒2
𝑛
𝑑𝑎
= −
𝑘1(𝑈1+𝑉1)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
< 0. That is, both 𝑝1
𝑛  and 𝑝2
𝑛  increase in 𝑎; both 𝑒1
𝑛  and 𝑒2
𝑛 
decrease in 𝑎 
From (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) we get 
𝑑𝑞1
𝑛
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑏1𝑡1(𝑈2+𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0, 
𝑑𝑞2
𝑛
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑏1𝑡2(𝑈2+𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0, 
𝑑𝐼1
𝑛
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡1𝑘1
2𝐴1(𝑈2+𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝐼2
𝑛
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡2𝑘1
2𝐴2(𝑈1+𝑉1)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1
𝑛,𝑒1
𝑛)
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡1𝑈1𝐴1(𝑈2+𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0  and 
𝑑𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝2
𝑛,𝑒2
𝑛)
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡2𝑈2𝐴2(𝑈1+𝑉1)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0. That is, both 𝑞1
𝑛  and 𝑞2
𝑛 increase in 𝑎; both 𝐼1
𝑛  and 𝐼2
𝑛 
increase in 𝑎; both 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1
𝑛, 𝑒1
𝑛) and 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝2
𝑛, 𝑒2
𝑛) increase in 𝑎. 
Define 𝑓(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =
𝑈2+𝑉2
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
 while 
𝑈2+𝑉2
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0. When 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡, then 𝑈1 = 𝑈2 =
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𝑈 (from Hessian Matrix of Nash model we know that 𝑈 > 0) and 𝑉1 = 𝑉2 = 𝑉, and we 
have 𝑓(𝑡, 𝑡) =
𝑈+𝑉
𝑈2−𝑉2
=
1
𝑈−𝑉
> 0. That is, for any 𝑡, we have 𝑈 > 𝑉. Replace 𝑡 with 𝑡1 
and 𝑡2 respectively, we have 𝑈1 > 𝑉1 and 𝑈2 > 𝑉2. Because of 𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > 0 and 𝑘1 >
𝑘2 > 0 , we can get 𝑏1𝑈1 − 𝑏2𝑉1 > 0 ,  𝑏1𝑈2 − 𝑏2𝑉2 > 0 , 4𝑏1𝑈2 − 2𝑏2𝑉2 > 0 , 4𝑏1𝑈1 −
2𝑏2𝑉1 > 0, 𝑘1
2𝑈2 − 𝑘1𝑘2𝑉2 > 0 and 𝑘1
2𝑈1 − 𝑘1𝑘2𝑉1 > 0. In Stackelberg model, 𝑝1
𝑠 = 𝑐 +
2𝑡𝑈𝐵 > 𝑐 , we have 𝐵 > 0. Because 𝐵 =
(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐+𝑏2𝑐−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)(𝑈+𝑉)
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0, and 𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑐 +
𝑏2𝑐 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0 > 0 and 𝑈
3 − 2𝑉2𝑈 − 𝑘2
2𝑉2 > 0 (this can be confirmed from Hessian 
Matrix of Stackelberg model), we have 𝑈 + 𝑉 > 0 for any 𝑡. Therefore, replace 𝑡 with 𝑡1 
and 𝑡2 respectively, we have 𝑈1 + 𝑉1 > 0 and 𝑈2 + 𝑉2 > 0. Combine 𝑈1 > 𝑉1 and 𝑈2 >
𝑉2, we can get 𝑈1 > |𝑉1| > 0 and 𝑈2 > |𝑉2| > 0, then we have 𝑈1𝑈2 − 𝑉1𝑉2 > 0. 
Proposition 1 shows 
𝑑𝑒1
𝑛
𝑑𝑐1
=
𝑘1( 𝑏1𝑈2−𝑏2𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0 and 
𝑑𝑒2
𝑛
𝑑𝑐2
=
𝑘1(𝑏1𝑈1−𝑏2𝑉1)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0. That is, 𝑒1
𝑛 
and 𝑒2
𝑛 respectively increases in 𝑐1 and 𝑐2. 
From (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8), we get 
𝑑𝑞1
𝑛
𝑑𝑐1
= −
2𝑏1𝑡1(𝑏1𝑈2−𝑏2𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
< 0 , 
𝑑𝑞2
𝑛
𝑑𝑐2
=
−
2𝑏1𝑡2(𝑏1𝑈1−𝑏2𝑉1)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
< 0 , 
𝑑𝐼1
𝑛
𝑑𝑐1
= −
2𝑡1𝑘1
2𝐴1(𝑏1𝑈2−𝑏2𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
< 0 , 
𝑑𝐼2
𝑛
𝑑𝑐2
= −
2𝑡1𝑘1
2𝐴2(𝑏1𝑈1−𝑏2𝑉1)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
< 0 , 
𝑑𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1
𝑛,𝑒1
𝑛)
𝑑𝑐1
= −
2𝑡1𝑈1𝐴1(𝑏1𝑈2−𝑏2𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
< 0 and 
𝑑𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝2
𝑛,𝑒2
𝑛)
𝑑𝑐2
= −
2𝑡2𝑈2𝐴2(𝑏1𝑈2−𝑏2𝑉2)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
< 0. That is, 𝑞1
𝑛, 
𝐼1
𝑛 and 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝1
𝑛, 𝑒1
𝑛) all decreases in 𝑐1 and 𝑞2
𝑛, 𝐼2
𝑛 and 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝2
𝑛, 𝑒2
𝑛) all decreases in 𝑐2. 
Proposition 1 shows 
𝑑𝑝1
𝑛
𝑑𝑡1
= −2
𝑘1
2𝑈2−𝑘1𝑘2𝑉2
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
𝐴1 < 0 , 
𝑑𝑝2
𝑛
𝑑𝑡2
= −2
𝑘1
2𝑈1−𝑘1𝑘2𝑉1
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
𝐴2 < 0 , 
𝑑𝑒1
𝑛
𝑑𝑡1
=
4𝑏1𝑈2−2𝑏2𝑉2
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
𝑘1𝐴1 > 0  and 
𝑑𝑒2
𝑛
𝑑𝑡2
=
4𝑏1𝑈1−2𝑏2𝑉1
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
𝑘1𝐴2 > 0 . That is, 𝑝1
𝑛  and 𝑝2
𝑛 
respectively decrease in 𝑡1 and 𝑡2; 𝑒1
𝑛 and 𝑒2
𝑛 respectively increase in 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 
From (3) and (4), we get 
𝑑𝑞1
𝑛
𝑑𝑡1
= −2
𝑘1
2𝑈2−𝑘1𝑘2𝑉2
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
𝑏1𝐴1 < 0, 
𝑑𝑞2
𝑛
𝑑𝑡2
= −2
𝑘1
2𝑈1−𝑘1𝑘2𝑉1
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
𝑏1𝐴2 <
0. That is, 𝑞1
𝑛 and 𝑞2
𝑛 respectively decrease in 𝑡1 and 𝑡2. This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
In a Stackelberg game, we let 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐 and 𝑡1 = 𝑡2 = 𝑡, and the manufacturer 1 is the 
Stackelberg leader while the manufacturer 2 is the Stackelberg follower. From the Proof of 
26 
Proposition 1, we know that |
𝜕2𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑒2)
𝜕𝑝2
2
𝜕2𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑒2)
𝜕𝑝2𝜕𝑒2
𝜕2𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒2𝜕𝑝2
𝜕2𝜋2(𝑝2,𝑒2)
𝜕𝑒2
2
| = 4𝑏1𝑡 − 𝑘1
2 = 𝑈 > 0 . Therefore, 
𝜋2(𝑝2, 𝑒2) is a joint concave function of 𝑝2 and 𝑒2. When 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐, (1-3) and (1-4) can 
be rewritten as  
 (𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑝2 + 𝑏2𝑝1 − 𝑘1𝑒2 + 𝑘2𝑒1) − 𝑏1(𝑝2 − 𝑐) = 0 (2-1) 
−𝑘1(𝑝2 − 𝑐) + 2𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒2) = 0 (2-2) 
From (2-1) and (2-2), we get  
𝑝2 = −
−2(𝑎+𝑏1𝑐+𝑘2𝑒1+𝑏2𝑝1)𝑡+𝑘1(𝑘1𝑐+2𝑒0𝑡)
𝑈
 (2-3) 
𝑒2 = −
𝑎𝑘1−𝑏1𝑐𝑘1+𝑒1𝑘1𝑘2+𝑏2𝑘1𝑝1−4𝑏1𝑒0𝑡
𝑈
 (2-4) 
Substitute (2-3) and (2-4) into (1), we have 
𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑒1) = (𝑝1 − 𝑐)[𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑝1 + 𝑏2(−
−2(𝑎+𝑏1𝑐+𝑘2𝑒1+𝑏2𝑝1)𝑡+𝑘1(𝑘1𝑐+2𝑒0𝑡)
𝑈
) − 𝑘1𝑒1 +
𝑘2(−
𝑎𝑘1−𝑏1𝑐𝑘1+𝑒1𝑘1𝑘2+𝑏2𝑘1𝑝1−4𝑏1𝑒0𝑡
𝑈
)] − 𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒1)
2 (2-5) 
From (2-5), we get 
𝜕𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1
= [𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑝1 + 𝑏2 (−
−2(𝑎+𝑏1𝑐+𝑘2𝑒1+𝑏2𝑝1)𝑡+𝑘1(𝑘1𝑐+2𝑒0𝑡)
𝑈
) −
𝑘1𝑒1 + 𝑘2 (−
𝑎𝑘1−𝑏1𝑐𝑘1+𝑒1𝑘1𝑘2+𝑏2𝑘1𝑝1−4𝑏1𝑒0𝑡
𝑈
)] + (−𝑏1 +
2𝑏2
2𝑡
𝑈
−
𝑏2𝑘1𝑘2
𝑈
)(𝑝1 − 𝑐)  and 
𝜕𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1
= (
2𝑏2𝑘2𝑡
𝑈
− 𝑘1 −
𝑘1𝑘2
2
𝑈
)(𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 2𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒1) . Then，  we obtain 
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1
2 =
−2𝑏1 −
2𝑏2𝑘1𝑘2
𝑈
+
4𝑏2
2𝑡
𝑈
< 0 , 
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1
2 = −2𝑡  and 
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1𝜕𝑒1
=
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1𝜕𝑝1
= −𝑘1 −
𝑘1𝑘2
2
𝑈
+
2𝑏2𝑘2𝑡
𝑈
, then |
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1
2
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1𝜕𝑒1
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1𝜕𝑝1
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1
2
| =
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
𝑈2
> 0. Therefore, 𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑒1) is a joint 
concave function of 𝑝1 and 𝑒1. 
Let 
𝜕𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1
= 0 and 
𝜕𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1
= 0, we get 
[𝑎 − 𝑏1𝑝1 + 𝑏2 (−
−2(𝑎+𝑏1𝑐+𝑘2𝑒1+𝑏2𝑝1)𝑡+𝑘1(𝑘1𝑐+2𝑒0𝑡)
𝑈
) − 𝑘1𝑒1 +
𝑘2 (−
𝑎𝑘1−𝑏1𝑐𝑘1+𝑒1𝑘1𝑘2+𝑏2𝑘1𝑝1−4𝑏1𝑒0𝑡
𝑈
)] + (−𝑏1 +
2𝑏2
2𝑡
𝑈
−
𝑏2𝑘1𝑘2
𝑈
)(𝑝1 − 𝑐) = 0 (2-6) 
(
2𝑏2𝑘2𝑡
𝑈
− 𝑘1 −
𝑘1𝑘2
2
𝑈
)(𝑝1 − 𝑐) + 2𝑡(𝑒0 − 𝑒1) = 0 (2-7) 
From (2-6) and (2-7), we get 𝑝1
𝑠 = 𝑐 + 2𝑡𝑈𝐵 and 𝑒1
𝑠 = 𝑒0 − (𝑘1𝑈 − 𝑘2𝑉)𝐵. Substitute 
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( 𝑝1
𝑠 , 𝑒1
𝑠 ) into (2-3) and (2-4), we can obtain 𝑝2
𝑠 = 𝑐 + 2𝑡𝐶  and 𝑒2
𝑠 = 𝑒0 − 𝑘1𝐶 . As 
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
𝑈2
> 0, we have 𝑈3 − 2𝑉2𝑈 − 𝑘2
2𝑉2 > 0. Due to 𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑝2
𝑠 > 𝑐, we have 𝐵, 𝐶 > 0. 
This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 
As we proved in the Proof of Corollary 1, we can easily get (𝑏1𝑈 − 𝑏2𝑉)(𝑈 + 𝑉) > 0 and 
(𝑘1𝑈 − 𝑘2𝑉)(𝑈 + 𝑉) > 0.  
In Stackelberg model, the leader manufacturer 1’s profit function 𝜋1(𝑝1, 𝑒1) is a joint 
concave function of 𝑝1  and 𝑒1 , it must satisfy Hessian |
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1
2
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑝1𝜕𝑒1
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1𝜕𝑝1
𝜕2𝜋1(𝑝1,𝑒1)
𝜕𝑒1
2
| =
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
𝑈2
> 0, then we have 𝑈3 − 2𝑉2𝑈 − 𝑘2
2𝑉2 > 0. Because optimal price 𝑝2
𝑠 = 𝑐 +
2𝑡𝐶 > 𝑐, we get 𝐶 =
(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐+𝑏2𝑐−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)[(𝑈+𝑘2
2)𝑉+(𝑈2−𝑉2)]
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0. Therefore, combine 𝑎 −
𝑏1𝑐 + 𝑏2𝑐 − 𝑘1𝑒0 + 𝑘2𝑒0 > 0  and 𝑈
3 − 2𝑉2𝑈 − 𝑘2
2𝑉2 > 0 , we have (𝑈 + 𝑘2
2)𝑉 +
(𝑈2 − 𝑉2) > 0.  
The above results will be used in the following proof. 
Proposition 2 shows 
𝑑𝑝1
𝑠
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡𝑈(𝑈+𝑉)
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑝2
𝑠
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡[(𝑈+𝑘2
2)𝑉+(𝑈2−𝑉2)]
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑒1
𝑠
𝑑𝑎
=
−
(𝑘1𝑈−𝑘2𝑉)(𝑈+𝑉)
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
< 0  and 
𝑑𝑒2
𝑠
𝑑𝑎
= −
𝑘1[(𝑈+𝑘2
2)𝑉+(𝑈2−𝑉2)]
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
< 0 . That is, both 𝑝1
𝑠  and 𝑝2
𝑠 
increase in 𝑎; both 𝑒1
𝑠 and 𝑒2
𝑠 decrease in 𝑎. 
Form (9), (10), (11), (12), (13) and (14), we get 
𝑑𝑞1
𝑠
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡(𝑏1𝑈−𝑏2𝑉)(𝑈+𝑉)
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0, 
𝑑𝑞2
𝑠
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡𝑏1[(𝑈+𝑘2
2)𝑉+(𝑈2−𝑉2)]
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝐼1
𝑠
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡(𝑘1𝑈−𝑘2𝑉)
2𝐵(𝑈+𝑉)
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝐼2
𝑠
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡𝑘1
2𝐶[(𝑈+𝑘2
2)𝑉+(𝑈2−𝑉2)]
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝜋1
𝑠 (𝑝1
𝑠 ,𝑒1
𝑠)
𝑑𝑎
= 2𝑡𝐵(𝑈 + 𝑉) > 0 and 
𝑑𝜋2
𝑠 (𝑝2
𝑠 ,𝑒2
𝑠)
𝑑𝑎
=
2𝑡𝑈𝐶[(𝑈+𝑘2
2)𝑉+(𝑈2−𝑉2)]
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0. That is, 𝑞1
𝑠 , 𝑞2
𝑠 , 
𝐼1
𝑠, 𝐼2
𝑠, 𝜋1
𝑠(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠) and  𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) all increase in 𝑎. 
Proposition 2 shows 
𝑑𝑒1
𝑠
𝑑𝑐
=
(𝑘1𝑈−𝑘2𝑉)(𝑏1−𝑏2)(𝑈−𝑉)
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0 , 
𝑑𝑒2
𝑠
𝑑𝑐
=
𝑘1(𝑏1−𝑏2)[(𝑈+𝑘2
2)𝑉+(𝑈2−𝑉2)]
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
> 0. That is, both 𝑒1
𝑠 and 𝑒2
𝑠 increases in 𝑐. 
From (9), (10), (11), (12), (13) and (14), we get 
𝑑𝑞1
𝑠
𝑑𝑐
= −
2𝑡(𝑏1−𝑏2)(𝑈+𝑉)(𝑏1𝑈−𝑏2𝑉)
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
< 0, 
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𝑑𝑞2
𝑠
𝑑𝑐
= −
2𝑏1𝑡(𝑏1−𝑏2)[(𝑈+𝑘2
2)𝑉+(𝑈2−𝑉2)]
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
< 0 , 
𝑑𝐼1
𝑠
𝑑𝑐
= −
2𝑡(𝑘1𝑈−𝑘2𝑉)
2𝐵(𝑏1−𝑏2)(𝑈+𝑉)
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
< 0 , 
𝑑𝐼2
𝑠
𝑑𝑐
=
−
2𝑡𝑘1
2𝐶(𝑏1−𝑏2)[(𝑈+𝑘2
2)𝑉+(𝑈2−𝑉2)]
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
< 0 , 
𝑑𝜋1
𝑠 (𝑝1
𝑠 ,𝑒1
𝑠)
𝑑𝑐
= −2𝑡𝐵(𝑏1 − 𝑏2)(𝑈 + 𝑉) < 0  and 
𝑑𝜋2
𝑠 (𝑝2
𝑠 ,𝑒2
𝑠)
𝑑𝑐
= −2𝑡𝑈𝐶(𝑏1 − 𝑏2)[(𝑈 + 𝑘2
2)𝑉 + (𝑈2 − 𝑉2)] < 0. That is, 𝑞1
𝑠, 𝐼1
𝑠, 𝜋1
𝑠(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠), 𝑞2
𝑠, 
𝐼2
𝑠 and 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) all decreases in 𝑐. This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
1) From proposition 1, we get 𝑝𝑐1
𝑛 − 𝑝𝑐2
𝑛 =
(𝑐1−𝑐2)(−𝑘1
2−𝑘1𝑘2+2𝑏1𝑡)
𝑈+𝑉
. So, if 𝑡 <
𝑘1
2+𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏1
, then 
𝑝𝑐1
𝑛 > 𝑝𝑐2
𝑛 ; if 𝑡 =
𝑘1
2+𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏1
, then 𝑝𝑐1
𝑛 = 𝑝𝑐2
𝑛 ; if 𝑡 >
𝑘1
2+𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏1
, then 𝑝𝑐1
𝑛 < 𝑝𝑐2
𝑛 . 
2) From proposition 1, we get 𝑒𝑐1
𝑛 − 𝑒𝑐2
𝑛 =
𝑘1(𝑐1−𝑐2)(𝑏1+𝑏2)
𝑈+𝑉
< 0. That is, 𝑒𝑐1
𝑛 < 𝑒𝑐2
𝑛 . 
3) From (3) and (4), we get 𝑞𝑐1
𝑛 − 𝑞𝑐2
𝑛 = 2𝑏1𝑡(𝐴1 − 𝐴2). Because 𝑒𝑐1
𝑛 < 𝑒𝑐2
𝑛 , we get 𝐴1 > 𝐴2. 
Therefore, 𝑞𝑐1
𝑛 − 𝑞𝑐2
𝑛 > 0. That is, 𝑞𝑐1
𝑛 > 𝑞𝑐2
𝑛 . 
4) From (5) and (6), we get 𝐼𝑐1
𝑛 − 𝐼𝑐2
𝑛 =  𝑡𝑘1
2(𝐴1
2 − 𝐴2
2) > 0. That is, 𝐼𝑐1
𝑛 > 𝐼𝑐2
𝑛 . 
5) From (7) and (8), we get 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝𝑐1
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑐1
𝑛 ) − 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝𝑐2
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑐2
𝑛 ) = 𝑡𝑈(𝐴1
2 − 𝐴2
2) > 0 . That is, 
𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝𝑐1
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑐1
𝑛 ) > 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝𝑐2
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑐2
𝑛 ). This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
1) From proposition 1, we get 𝑝𝑡1
𝑛 − 𝑝𝑡2
𝑛 =
2𝑘1(𝑘1+𝑘2)(𝑡2−𝑡1)(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐+𝑏2𝑐−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
> 0. That is, 
𝑝𝑡1
𝑛 > 𝑝𝑡2
𝑛 . 
2) From proposition 1, we get 𝑒𝑡1
𝑛 − 𝑒𝑡2
𝑛 = −
2𝑘1(2𝑏1+𝑏2)(𝑡2−𝑡1)(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐+𝑏2𝑐−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)
𝑈1𝑈2−𝑉1𝑉2
< 0. That 
is, 𝑒𝑡1
𝑛 < 𝑒𝑡2
𝑛 . 
3) From (3) and (4), we get 𝑞𝑡1
𝑛 − 𝑞𝑡2
𝑛 = 2𝑏1𝑡(𝐴1 − 𝐴2). Because 𝑒𝑡1
𝑛 < 𝑒𝑡2
𝑛 , we get 𝐴1 > 𝐴2. 
Therefore, 𝑞𝑡1
𝑛 − 𝑞𝑡2
𝑛 > 0. That is, 𝑞𝑡1
𝑛 > 𝑞𝑡2
𝑛 . 
4) From (5) and (6), we get 𝐼𝑡1
𝑛 − 𝐼𝑡2
𝑛 =  𝑡𝑘1
2(𝐴1
2 − 𝐴2
2) > 0. That is, 𝐼𝑡1
𝑛 > 𝐼𝑡2
𝑛 .  
5) From (7) and (8), we get 
𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝𝑡1
𝑛 ,𝑒𝑡1
𝑛 )
𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝𝑡2
𝑛 ,𝑒𝑡2
𝑛 )
=
𝑡1𝑈1
(𝑈1+𝑉1)2
∙
(𝑈2+𝑉2)
2
𝑡2𝑈2
. So, if 
𝑡1𝑈1
(𝑈1+𝑉1)2
∙
(𝑈2+𝑉2)
2
𝑡2𝑈2
> 1, that 
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is if 
𝑡1
𝑡2
>
(𝑈1+𝑉1)
2𝑈2
(𝑈2+𝑉2)2𝑈1
, then 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝𝑡1
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑡1
𝑛 ) > 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝𝑡2
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑡2
𝑛 ); if 
𝑡1𝑈1
(𝑈1+𝑉1)2
∙
(𝑈2+𝑉2)
2
𝑡2𝑈2
= 1, that is if 
𝑡1
𝑡2
=
(𝑈1+𝑉1)
2𝑈2
(𝑈2+𝑉2)2𝑈1
, then 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝𝑡1
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑡1
𝑛 ) = 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝𝑡2
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑡2
𝑛 ); if 
𝑡1𝑈1
(𝑈1+𝑉1)2
∙
(𝑈2+𝑉2)
2
𝑡2𝑈2
< 1, that is if 
𝑡1
𝑡2
<
(𝑈1+𝑉1)
2𝑈2
(𝑈2+𝑉2)2𝑈1
, then 𝜋1
𝑛(𝑝𝑡1
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑡1
𝑛 ) < 𝜋2
𝑛(𝑝𝑡2
𝑛 , 𝑒𝑡2
𝑛 ). This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
1) From proposition 2, we get 𝑝1
𝑠 − 𝑝2
𝑠 =
2(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐+𝑏2𝑐−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)𝑡(−𝑘1𝑘2+2𝑏2𝑡)(−𝑘1𝑘2−𝑘2
2+2𝑏2𝑡)
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
, 
if 𝑡 ∈ (0,
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
) ∪ (
𝑘1𝑘2+𝑘2
2
2𝑏2
, +∞), then 𝑝1
𝑠 > 𝑝2
𝑠; if 𝑡 =
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
 or 
𝑘1𝑘2+𝑘2
2
2𝑏2
, then 𝑝1
𝑠 = 𝑝2
𝑠; 𝑡 ∈
(
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
,
𝑘1𝑘2+𝑘2
2
2𝑏2
), then 𝑝1
𝑠 < 𝑝2
𝑠.  
2) From proposition 2, we get 𝑒1
𝑠 − 𝑒2
𝑠 =
2(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐+𝑏2𝑐−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)𝑡(2𝑏1𝑘2+𝑏2𝑘2−𝑏2𝑘1)(2𝑏2𝑡−𝑘1𝑘2)
𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2
, 
if (2𝑏1𝑘2 + 𝑏2𝑘2 − 𝑏2𝑘1)(2𝑏2𝑡 − 𝑘1𝑘2) > 0, then 𝑒1
𝑠 > 𝑒2
𝑠 ; if 2𝑏1𝑘2 + 𝑏2𝑘2 − 𝑏2𝑘1 = 0 
or 2𝑏2𝑡 − 𝑘1𝑘2 = 0 , then 𝑒1
𝑠 = 𝑒2
𝑠 ; if (2𝑏1𝑘2 + 𝑏2𝑘2 − 𝑏2𝑘1)(2𝑏2𝑡 − 𝑘1𝑘2) < 0 , then 
𝑒1
𝑠 < 𝑒2
𝑠. This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
From (13) and (14), we get 𝜋1
𝑠(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠) − 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) =
4(𝑎−𝑏1𝑐+𝑏2𝑐−𝑘1𝑒0+𝑘2𝑒0)
2𝑡2𝑉(𝑏2𝑘1𝑘2−𝑏1𝑘2
2−𝑏2
2𝑡)(3𝑈𝑉+2𝑈2+𝑘2
2𝑉)𝑉
(𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2)2
, if (𝑏2𝑘1𝑘2 − 𝑏1𝑘2
2 −
𝑏2
2𝑡)(3𝑈𝑉 + 2𝑈2 + 𝑘2
2𝑉)𝑉 > 0, then 𝜋1
𝑠(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠) > 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠); if 𝑡 =
𝑏2𝑘1𝑘2−𝑏1𝑘2
2
𝑏2
2  or 
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
 
or 3𝑈𝑉 + 2𝑈2 + 𝑘2
2𝑉 = 0 , then 𝜋1
𝑠(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠) = 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) ; if (𝑏2𝑘1𝑘2 − 𝑏1𝑘2
2 −
𝑏2
2𝑡)(3𝑈𝑉 + 2𝑈2 + 𝑘2
2𝑉)𝑉 < 0, then 𝜋1
𝑠(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠) < 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠). This completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 
(1) For the Stackelberg leader with more market power 
1) 𝑝1
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑛 = 2𝑡
𝑉2(𝑈+𝑘2
2)
(𝑈−𝑉)(𝑈3−2𝑈𝑉2−𝑉2𝑘2
2)
. Due to 𝑈 > 0, 𝑈 − 𝑉 > 0, 𝑈3 − 2𝑈𝑉2 − 𝑉2𝑘2
2 > 0 
and 𝑉2 ≥ 0 , 
𝑉2(𝑈+𝑘2
2)
(𝑈−𝑉)(𝑈3−2𝑈𝑉2−𝑉2𝑘2
2)
≥ 0 . Therefore, 𝑝1
𝑠 ≥ 𝑝𝑛 . 𝑒1
𝑠 − 𝑒𝑛 =
𝑘1(𝑈+𝑘2
2)
(𝑈−𝑉)(𝑈3−2𝑈𝑉2−𝑉2𝑘2
2)
(2𝑏2𝑡 − 𝑘1𝑘2)(𝛾 − 2𝑏2𝑡 + 𝑘1𝑘2) , where 𝛾 =
𝑘2(𝑈
2−𝑉2)
𝑘1(𝑈+𝑘2
2)
> 0 . Due to 
𝑈 > 0  and 𝑈2 − 𝑉2 > 0 , 𝛾 > 0 . Because of 𝑈 − 𝑉 > 0  and 𝑈3 − 2𝑈𝑉2 − 𝑉2𝑘2
2 > 0 , 
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𝑘1(𝑈+𝑘2
2)
(𝑈−𝑉)(𝑈3−2𝑈𝑉2−𝑉2𝑘2
2)
> 0. Therefore, if 𝑡 ∈ (0,
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
), then 𝑒1
𝑠 < 𝑒𝑛; if 𝑡 ∈ [
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
,
𝑘1𝑘2+𝛾
2𝑏2
], 
then 𝑒1
𝑠 ≥ 𝑒𝑛; if 𝑡 ∈ (
𝑘1𝑘2+𝛾
2𝑏2
, +∞), then 𝑒1
𝑠 < 𝑒𝑛. 
2) 𝜋1
𝑠(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠) − 𝜋𝑛(𝑝𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) =
𝑉2(𝑉2+𝑈𝑘2
2)
(𝑈−𝑉)2(𝑈3−2𝑈𝑉2−𝑉2𝑘2
2)
. Due to 𝑈 > 0 , 𝑈 − 𝑉 > 0 , 𝑈3 −
2𝑈𝑉2 − 𝑉2𝑘2
2 > 0  and 𝑉2 ≥ 0 , 
𝑉2(𝑈+𝑘2
2)
(𝑈−𝑉)(𝑈3−2𝑈𝑉2−𝑉2𝑘2
2)
≥ 0 . Therefore, 𝜋1
𝑠(𝑝1
𝑠, 𝑒1
𝑠) ≥
𝜋𝑛(𝑝𝑛, 𝑒𝑛).  
(2) For the Stackelberg follower with less market power 
1) 𝑝2
𝑠 − 𝑝𝑛 =
(2𝑏2𝑡−𝑘1𝑘2)(𝑉
2+𝑈𝑘2
2)
(𝑈−𝑉)(𝑈3−2𝑈𝑉2−𝑉2𝑘2
2)
 and 𝑒2
𝑠 − 𝑒𝑛 = −
(2𝑏2𝑡−𝑘1𝑘2)(𝑉
2+𝑈𝑘2
2)
(𝑈−𝑉)(𝑈3−2𝑈𝑉2−𝑉2𝑘2
2)
. Due to 𝑈 > 0 , 
𝑈 − 𝑉 > 0, 𝑈3 − 2𝑈𝑉2 − 𝑉2𝑘2
2 > 0 and 𝑉2 ≥ 0, 
𝑉2+𝑈𝑘2
2
(𝑈−𝑉)(𝑈3−2𝑈𝑉2−𝑉2𝑘2
2)
> 0. Therefore, if 
𝑡 ∈ (0,
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
], then 𝑝2
𝑠 ≤ 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑒2
𝑠 ≥ 𝑒𝑛; if 𝑡 ∈ (
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
, +∞), then 𝑝2
𝑠 > 𝑝𝑛 and 𝑒2
𝑠 < 𝑒𝑛.  
2) 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) − 𝜋𝑛(𝑝𝑛, 𝑒𝑛) =
(𝑉2+𝑈𝑘2
2)
2
(𝑈−𝑉)2(𝑈3−2𝑈𝑉2−𝑉2𝑘2
2)
2 (2𝑏2𝑡 − 𝑘1𝑘2)(2𝑏2𝑡 − 𝑘1𝑘2 + 𝛿) , 
where 𝛿 =
2(𝑈3−2𝑉2𝑈−𝑘2
2𝑉2)
𝑉2+𝑈𝑘2
2 . Due to 𝑈 > 0 and 𝑈
2 − 𝑉2 > 0, 𝛿 > 0. When 𝑘1𝑘2 − 𝛿 > 0, 
if 𝑡 ∈ (0,
𝑘1𝑘2−𝛿
2𝑏2
), then 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑛(𝑝𝑛, 𝑒𝑛); if 𝑡 ∈ [
𝑘1𝑘2−𝛿
2𝑏2
,
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
], then 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) ≤
𝜋𝑛(𝑝𝑛, 𝑒𝑛); if 𝑡 ∈ (
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
, +∞), then 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑛(𝑝𝑛, 𝑒𝑛). When 𝑘1𝑘2 − 𝛿 < 0, if 𝑡 ∈
(0,
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
], then 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) ≤ 𝜋𝑛(𝑝𝑛, 𝑒𝑛); if 𝑡 ∈ (
𝑘1𝑘2
2𝑏2
, +∞), then 𝜋2
𝑠(𝑝2
𝑠, 𝑒2
𝑠) > 𝜋𝑛(𝑝𝑛, 𝑒𝑛). 
This completes the proof. 
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